{"id":3737,"date":"2024-09-30T12:29:05","date_gmt":"2024-09-30T09:29:05","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.hvtd.org\/?p=3737"},"modified":"2024-09-30T12:29:05","modified_gmt":"2024-09-30T09:29:05","slug":"organizasyonel-kazalar","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.hvtd.org\/?p=3737","title":{"rendered":"ORGAN\u0130ZASYONEL KAZALAR"},"content":{"rendered":"<p>Yazar : Prof. Dr. Muzaffer \u00c7eting\u00fc\u00e7<\/p>\n<p>Yay\u0131nlanma tarihi : 14 Ekim 2018<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"https:\/\/www.airkule.com\/yazar\/ORGANIZASYONEL-KAZALAR\/1291\/\">https:\/\/www.airkule.com\/yazar\/ORGANIZASYONEL-KAZALAR\/1291\/<\/a><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color: #2e2e2e; font-family: Arial;\"><em>\u2018Bu kazay\u0131 hep birlikte yapt\u0131k!\u2019<\/em><\/span><\/p>\n<p>\u2018\u00c7\u00fcr\u00fck Elma Teorisi\u2019ne g\u00f6re, \u201cSistem \u00e7ok iyi, u\u00e7aklar da m\u00fckemmeldir; ama tembel, uyu\u015fuk, beceriksiz veya zay\u0131f insanlar vard\u0131r ve kazalar bunlar\u0131n y\u00fcz\u00fcnden olmaktad\u0131r. \u00c7\u00fcr\u00fck elmalar\u00a0<em>(bad apples, rotten apples)<\/em>\u00a0sistemden uzakla\u015ft\u0131r\u0131l\u0131rsa kazalar b\u00fcy\u00fck \u00f6l\u00e7\u00fcde \u00f6nlenmi\u015f olur&#8230; Bug\u00fcn bu teorinin ge\u00e7erlili\u011fine inanan kalmam\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. Kazalar\u0131n 2\/3\u2019\u00fcnde major sebep unsurunun insan-lar oldu\u011fu do\u011frudur. Evet her ortamda problemli ki\u015filer olabilir, ancak hatalar\u0131n \u00e7o\u011fu sisteme ait nedenlerle olu\u015fur; sorunu baz\u0131 bireylere (g\u00fcnah ke\u00e7ilerine) y\u0131kmak k\u00f6rl\u00fckt\u00fcr ve yanl\u0131\u015ft\u0131r (1).<\/p>\n<p><img decoding=\"async\" src=\"https:\/\/www.airkule.com\/images\/image\/image001.jpg\" alt=\"\" \/><\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p>Sadece havac\u0131l\u0131k i\u00e7in de\u011fil, emniyetin s\u00f6z konusu oldu\u011fu b\u00fct\u00fcn alanlarda 1960\u2019l\u0131 y\u0131llar\u0131n sonuna kadar teknik fakt\u00f6rler \u00e7ok \u00f6nemsenmekteydi. M\u00fchendislik \u00e7al\u0131\u015fmalar\u0131yla bunlar b\u00fcy\u00fck \u00f6l\u00e7\u00fcde giderildi, ama kaza oranlar\u0131 nedense de\u011fi\u015fmedi. 1970-1995 aras\u0131nda\u00a0 insan fakt\u00f6rlerinin \u00f6nemi fark edildi; sistemin motoru veya kalbi olan insanlar\u0131n stres ve motivasyonlar\u0131, inkapasitasyonlar\u0131, psikolojileri, ili\u015fki-ileti\u015fim-i\u015fbirli\u011fi sorunlar\u0131 (CRM) \u00fczerinde \u00e7al\u0131\u015f\u0131ld\u0131. Bu \u00e7ok iyi oldu ve halen de ge\u00e7erlili\u011fini yitirmedi, ama gene bir eksik vard\u0131. 1990\u2019lar\u0131n ortalar\u0131ndan itibaren organizasyonel fakt\u00f6rler ke\u015ffedildi (2).<\/p>\n<p><img decoding=\"async\" src=\"https:\/\/www.airkule.com\/images\/image\/image003.png\" alt=\"\" \/><\/p>\n<p>U\u00e7u\u015f kazalar\u0131nda insan hatas\u0131n\u0131n arka pl\u00e2n\u0131na bakan HFACS sistemi (\u0130nsan Fakt\u00f6rleri Analiz ve S\u0131n\u0131fland\u0131rma Sistemi;\u00a0<em>Human Factors Analysis and Classification System<\/em>) 1997 y\u0131l\u0131nda Amerikan Deniz Kuvvetleri taraf\u0131ndan geli\u015ftirildi\u011finde, kazalar\u0131 de\u011ferlendirmekte ufuklar\u0131m\u0131z daha bir geni\u015flemi\u015f oldu. 1990 y\u0131l\u0131nda James Reason taraf\u0131ndan ileri s\u00fcr\u00fclen \u0130svi\u00e7re Peyniri analojisini temel alan bu sistemde, en son hatal\u0131 hareketin\u00a0<em>(unsafe act<\/em>) faili olan operat\u00f6re de\u011fil, onu bu noktaya getiren \u00f6nceki sebeplere dikkat \u00e7ekilmektedir. Bu s\u00fcre\u00e7 sonunda havac\u0131l\u0131k terminolojisine \u2018Organizasyonel Kazalar\u2019 kavram\u0131 girmi\u015ftir.<\/p>\n<p><img decoding=\"async\" src=\"https:\/\/www.airkule.com\/images\/image\/image005.png\" alt=\"\" \/><\/p>\n<p>Operat\u00f6r hatalar\u0131 a\u00e7\u0131kt\u0131r ve su\u00e7lu (!) ortadad\u0131r; ama kazay\u0131 haz\u0131rlayan veya katk\u0131da bulunan di\u011ferleri genellikle biraz gizlidir, a\u00e7\u0131k\u00e7a g\u00f6r\u00fclmez. U\u00e7u\u015f kazalar\u0131nda pilot dahil t\u00fcm insanlar\u0131n bireysel hatalar\u0131n\u0131 bir tarafta tutal\u0131m ve onlar\u0131 ayr\u0131ca de\u011ferlendirelim. Sistemle ve y\u00f6netimle ilgili olanlara bakarsak; ekiplerin se\u00e7im ve e\u011fitiminden ba\u015flayarak, huzurlu bir \u00e7al\u0131\u015fma atmosferi ve kurumsal aidiyet hissi olu\u015fturulmas\u0131, adil y\u00f6netim stratejisi, motivasyon, disiplin, stres ve yorgunluk sorunlar\u0131n\u0131n \u00e7\u00f6z\u00fcm\u00fc, tak\u0131m \u00e7al\u0131\u015fmas\u0131n\u0131n sa\u011flanmas\u0131, cihazlar\u0131n ve teknik sistem eksiklerinin giderilmesi, talimat ve emirlerin d\u00fczenlenmesi, vb. gibi unsurlar\u0131n ciddiyetle ele al\u0131n\u0131p al\u0131nmad\u0131\u011f\u0131 b\u00fcy\u00fck \u00f6nem ta\u015f\u0131r.<\/p>\n<p>\u2018\u0130nsan yap\u0131m\u0131\u2019 kazalarda bir kulu\u00e7ka devresi\u00a0<em>(<\/em><em>disaster incubation period)<\/em>\u00a0vard\u0131r. E\u011fer sistem i\u00e7indeki \u00e7e\u015fitli kademelerde hata ve eksikler s\u00fcrmekte ise, \u0130svi\u00e7re peyniri dilimlerindeki deliklerin ayn\u0131 hizaya gelmesi (kaza) her an kap\u0131dad\u0131r (3). Bazen hizalar \u015fa\u015far (il\u00e2hlar\u0131n da yard\u0131m\u0131yla) kaza olmaz; bazen zincirin ara halkalar\u0131ndan biri ya da en son halkas\u0131 kazay\u0131 \u00f6nleyen ki\u015fi olabilir.<\/p>\n<p>Bu yakla\u015f\u0131m sayesinde emniyetin de, u\u00e7u\u015f kazalar\u0131n\u0131n da sadece operat\u00f6r\u00fcn (pilot, kontrol\u00f6r, bak\u0131mc\u0131) tekil eylemi olmad\u0131\u011f\u0131; t\u00fcm payda\u015flar\u0131n katk\u0131lar\u0131yla yap\u0131ld\u0131\u011f\u0131 fark edilmi\u015ftir. Sisteme ve bireylere ait zincirleme hatalarla ger\u00e7ekle\u015fen kazalar i\u00e7in, \u2018Bu kazay\u0131 maalesef elbirli\u011fiyle yapt\u0131k!\u2019 diyebilmek erdemli bir itiraft\u0131r. Asl\u0131nda bunlar i\u00e7in \u2018kaza\u2019 teriminin kullan\u0131lmas\u0131 da yanl\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. Gol\u00fc kaleci yedi\u011fi, ma\u00e7\u0131 sahadaki tak\u0131m kaybetti\u011fi halde baz\u0131 antren\u00f6rler, \u201cgol\u00fc yedik, ma\u00e7\u0131 kaybettik\u201d s\u00f6zleriyle sorumluluktaki pay\u0131n\u0131 kabul eder. Ma\u00e7 kazan\u0131ld\u0131\u011f\u0131nda yendik diyebilmek i\u00e7in, \u00f6zele\u015ftiri yap\u0131p \u201cyenildik\u201d de diyebilmek gerekir \u00e7\u00fcnk\u00fc\u2026 Havayolu \u015firketlerinin y\u00f6neticilerinin de yanl\u0131\u015f giden durumlarda cesaretle sorumluluk alabilmesi beklenir; etik olan budur.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Organizasyonel kaza \u00f6rnekleri<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>\u00d6rne\u011fin Titanik facias\u0131, bir dizi ihmal ve umursamazl\u0131\u011f\u0131n sonucunda olmu\u015ftur ve \u2018kaza\u2019 de\u011fildir. Asla batmaz denen 269 metre uzunluktaki Titanik\u00a0<em>(White Star)<\/em>\u00a0gemisi 1912 y\u0131l\u0131nda \u0130ngiltere-New York seferinde Kuzey Atlantik\u2019te bir buzda\u011f\u0131na \u00e7arparak batt\u0131. M\u00fcrettebat ve 2.223 yolcudan 1.513\u2019\u00fc donarak ve bo\u011fularak \u00f6ld\u00fc.<\/p>\n<p><img decoding=\"async\" src=\"https:\/\/www.airkule.com\/images\/image\/image007.jpg\" alt=\"\" \/><\/p>\n<p>Kazaya ve \u00f6l\u00fcmlere yol a\u00e7an hatalar ve ihmaller \u015funlard\u0131:<\/p>\n<p>1. Gemi g\u00f6vdesi yap\u0131m\u0131nda esnekli\u011fi olmayan \u00e7ok sert bir \u00e7elik kullan\u0131lm\u0131\u015ft\u0131,<\/p>\n<p>2. G\u00f6zc\u00fclere d\u00fcrb\u00fcn verilmedi\u011fi i\u00e7in buzda\u011flar\u0131n\u0131 uzaktan g\u00f6rememi\u015flerdi,<\/p>\n<p>3. \u0130mdat \u00e7a\u011fr\u0131lar\u0131n\u0131 alan yak\u0131ndaki bir geminin telsizcisi uyumakta idi,<\/p>\n<p>4. Nas\u0131l olsa batmayacak (!) olan bu g\u00fczel geminin d\u0131\u015f g\u00f6r\u00fcn\u00fc\u015f\u00fcn\u00fc bozmamas\u0131 i\u00e7in filika say\u0131s\u0131 yar\u0131 yar\u0131ya azalt\u0131lm\u0131\u015ft\u0131\u2026<\/p>\n<p><strong>Japon Havayollar\u0131 (JAL-123) kazas\u0131:<\/strong>\u00a012 A\u011fustos 1985 g\u00fcn\u00fc tarihte tek u\u00e7akta en \u00e7ok yolcu \u00f6l\u00fcm\u00fcyle sonu\u00e7lanan bir olay ger\u00e7ekle\u015fti. Tokyo Haneda Havaalan\u0131ndan kalkan Japon Havayollar\u0131n\u0131n Boeing 747-SR tipi u\u00e7a\u011f\u0131nda, 12 dakika sonra kuyruk k\u0131sm\u0131ndaki patlama ile hidrolikler bo\u015fald\u0131, kabin bas\u0131nc\u0131 kayboldu; u\u00e7ak bir da\u011fa \u00e7arpt\u0131. 520 insan\u0131n \u00f6ld\u00fc\u011f\u00fc bu kazaya bak\u0131ld\u0131\u011f\u0131nda;<\/p>\n<ol>\n<li>U\u00e7akta 7 y\u0131l \u00f6nceki bir kuyruk s\u00fcrtmesi y\u00fcz\u00fcnden hasarlanan b\u00f6lme yenilenirken, kaplamalar \u00e7ift s\u0131ra yerine tek s\u0131ra per\u00e7inlenmi\u015fti; zaman i\u00e7inde metal yorgunlu\u011fu nedeniyle o u\u00e7u\u015fta dikey stabilize kopmu\u015ftu,<\/li>\n<li>Japon h\u00fck\u00fcmeti, kaza yerine 20 dakika sonra ula\u015fan Amerikan Hava Kuvvetlerine ait helikoptere istihbarat gerek\u00e7esiyle yard\u0131m izni vermemi\u015fti,<\/li>\n<li>Japon kurtarma ekipleri 12 saat sonra gelebilmi\u015f, \u00f6l\u00fcmlerin fazlal\u0131\u011f\u0131 bu gecikme y\u00fcz\u00fcnden olmu\u015ftu.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p>Kazadan sonra JAL Ba\u015fkan\u0131 istifa, bak\u0131m m\u00fcd\u00fcr\u00fc ile Boeing superviz\u00f6r\u00fc de intihar ettiler (4). Bu kazadaki teknik hata, olay\u0131 ba\u015flatan unsur idi; ama \u00f6l\u00fcmlerin inan\u0131lmaz say\u0131ya \u00e7\u0131kmas\u0131 h\u00fck\u00fcmetin hatas\u0131yd\u0131.<\/p>\n<p><strong>British Airtours kazas\u0131 (Flight 28m):<\/strong>\u00a022 A\u011fustos 1985 sabah\u0131 06\u2019da Manchester\u2019den Corfu\u2019ya gidecek olan Boeing 737 u\u00e7a\u011f\u0131, kalk\u0131\u015f\u0131nda duyulan bir ses (daha \u00f6nce kaynak yap\u0131lan bir motor par\u00e7as\u0131n\u0131n kopup sol kanattaki yak\u0131t tank\u0131n\u0131 delmesi) nedeniyle abort etti. Hava trafik kontrol\u00f6r\u00fc, u\u00e7a\u011f\u0131n motorundan duman ve alev \u00e7\u0131kt\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 g\u00f6rerek u\u00e7a\u011f\u0131 yang\u0131n s\u00f6nd\u00fcrme merkezine y\u00f6nlendirdi. Yolcular tahliye edilirken itfaiye ekipleri yang\u0131n\u0131 s\u00f6nd\u00fcrmekte idi. U\u00e7aktaki 131 yolcudan, ate\u015fle hi\u00e7 temas etmeyen 53\u2019\u00fc dumandan bo\u011fularak \u00f6ld\u00fc. Sonu\u00e7 raporunda bunun nedenleri \u015f\u00f6yle s\u0131raland\u0131:<\/p>\n<p>1. Pilotlar gaz kolunda ve yak\u0131t bas\u0131n\u00e7 g\u00f6stergesinde bir problem oldu\u011funu, bunun \u00f6nceki g\u00fcnk\u00fc u\u00e7u\u015fta da g\u00f6r\u00fcld\u00fc\u011f\u00fcn\u00fc tespit etmelerine kar\u015f\u0131n, motorun normal \u00e7al\u0131\u015fmas\u0131 \u00fczerine kalk\u0131\u015f karar\u0131 vermi\u015flerdi,<\/p>\n<p>2. U\u00e7ak i\u00e7indeki acil \u00e7\u0131k\u0131\u015fa yerle\u015ftirilmi\u015f koltuklar ve buraya oturtulan\u00a0 anne ve iki \u00e7ocu\u011fun h\u0131zl\u0131 tahliyeyi zorla\u015ft\u0131rm\u0131\u015ft\u0131,<\/p>\n<p>3. Yang\u0131n s\u00f6nd\u00fcrme merkezine yakla\u015f\u0131rken, pilot r\u00fczg\u00e2r\u0131n y\u00f6n\u00fcn\u00fc dikkate almam\u0131\u015f, s\u0131zan yak\u0131t r\u00fczg\u00e2r yard\u0131m\u0131yla u\u00e7a\u011f\u0131n alt\u0131na s\u00fcr\u00fcklenmi\u015f ve yang\u0131n\u0131 b\u00fcy\u00fcm\u00fc\u015ft\u00fc,<\/p>\n<p>4. Kabin i\u00e7erisinde kullan\u0131lan koltuk kuma\u015f ve boyalar\u0131 yanmaz nitelikte de\u011fildi,<\/p>\n<p>5. \u00c7\u0131k\u0131\u015f kap\u0131 \u0131\u015f\u0131klar\u0131n\u0131n olmamas\u0131 y\u00fcz\u00fcnden, kabin i\u00e7erisindeki a\u015f\u0131r\u0131 duman\u0131n acil \u00e7\u0131k\u0131\u015flar\u0131 g\u00f6rmeyi engellemi\u015fti,<\/p>\n<p>6. Yang\u0131n s\u00f6nd\u00fcrme hidrantlar\u0131 bak\u0131ma al\u0131nd\u0131\u011f\u0131 i\u00e7in s\u00f6nd\u00fcrme yetersiz kalm\u0131\u015ft\u0131\u2026<\/p>\n<p><strong>ValuJet Miami kazas\u0131 (Flight 592):\u00a0<\/strong>11 May\u0131s 1996 g\u00fcn\u00fc Miami\u2019den Atlanta\u2019ya gidecek olan Valujet\u2019in DC-9 u\u00e7a\u011f\u0131 mekanik ar\u0131zalar y\u00fcz\u00fcnden 1 saat gecikmeli havalanm\u0131\u015ft\u0131. Kalk\u0131\u015f\u0131ndan 11 dakika sonra kargodan \u015fiddetli bir patlama sesi geldi, elektrik sistemi ar\u0131zaya ge\u00e7ti, kabine duman doldu. Kargodaki yang\u0131n y\u00fcz\u00fcnden u\u00e7ak Everglades\u2019e \u00e7ak\u0131ld\u0131; 105 yolcu ve 5 m\u00fcrettebattan kurtulan olmad\u0131. Kazan\u0131n nedeni, kargo b\u00f6l\u00fcm\u00fcne yanl\u0131\u015f yerle\u015ftirilmi\u015f kimyasal oksijen jenerat\u00f6rlerinin tutu\u015fmas\u0131 idi\u2026<\/p>\n<p><strong>Kolombiya kazas\u0131 (Flight 2933):<\/strong>\u00a028 Kas\u0131m 2016 gecesi Bolivya&#8217;dan kalkarak Kolombiya&#8217;ya giden LaMia Havayollar\u0131&#8217;na ait RJ85 tipi yolcu u\u00e7a\u011f\u0131, Medellin Havaalan\u0131na 17 km kala yak\u0131t\u0131 bitti\u011fi i\u00e7in d\u00fc\u015ft\u00fc. Kolombiya\u2018ya kupa final ma\u00e7\u0131 i\u00e7in seyahat etmekte olan Chapecoense tak\u0131m\u0131n\u0131n 19 futbolcusu ve teknik ekibiyle birlikte 71 ki\u015fi \u00f6ld\u00fc. Bu kazada \u2018kader\u2019 a\u011flar\u0131n\u0131, insan eliyle yap\u0131lan zincirleme hatalarla \u00f6rm\u00fc\u015ft\u00fc. \u0130svi\u00e7re peyniri dilimlerinde ayn\u0131 hizaya gelen delikler \u015funlard\u0131:<\/p>\n<p>1. Gece u\u00e7u\u015fuydu, sis ve ya\u011fmur y\u00fcz\u00fcnden g\u00f6r\u00fc\u015f zorluklar\u0131 vard\u0131.<\/p>\n<p>2. U\u00e7a\u011f\u0131n ful yak\u0131t ile menziline ula\u015fmas\u0131 \u00e7ok zordu. Rota \u00fczerinde Bogota havaalan\u0131 ikmal i\u00e7in uygundu, ama kaptan pilot inisiyatif alarak (!) oray\u0131 pas ge\u00e7ti,<\/p>\n<p>3. U\u00e7a\u011f\u0131n 2. pilotu Sisy Arias, 29 ya\u015f\u0131nda seksi bir mankendi; o g\u00fcn ilk u\u00e7u\u015funu yapmaktayd\u0131. Yeterlili\u011fi tart\u0131\u015fmal\u0131yd\u0131 ve kaptana hi\u00e7 m\u00fcdahale etmedi,<\/p>\n<p>4. Hava trafik kontrol\u00f6r\u00fc, durumu pek de acil olmayan ba\u015fka bir u\u00e7a\u011f\u0131n ini\u015fine odaklanm\u0131\u015ft\u0131; rahat tav\u0131rlarla, acil ini\u015f isteyen La Mia u\u00e7a\u011f\u0131n\u0131n durumunu iyice sorgulamadan havada bekleme talimat\u0131 vermi\u015fti,<\/p>\n<p>5. Hava Kuvvetlerinde albayl\u0131\u011fa kadar y\u00fckselmi\u015f tecr\u00fcbeli bir pilot olan kaptan, yak\u0131t\u0131n\u0131n bitti\u011fini kuleye s\u00f6ylememi\u015f ve ini\u015f \u00f6nceli\u011fi i\u00e7in \u0131srarc\u0131 olmam\u0131\u015ft\u0131,<\/p>\n<p>6.\u00a0 Venezuela\u2019n\u0131n bu ucuzcu \u015firketiyle sivil havac\u0131l\u0131k otoritesi aras\u0131ndaki akrabal\u0131k ili\u015fkilerinin ve ayr\u0131cal\u0131kl\u0131 uygulamalar\u0131n oldu\u011fu s\u00f6ylentileri vard\u0131; bu durumun denetim sorunlar\u0131 yaratt\u0131\u011f\u0131yla ilgili dedikodular bas\u0131na yans\u0131m\u0131\u015ft\u0131\u2026<\/p>\n<p>Tenerife gibi ba\u015fka \u00f6rnek kazalarla liste uzat\u0131labilir. Organizasyonel kazalar ba\u015fka \u00fclkelerde oluyor da bizde olmuyor mu derseniz? Tabii ki oluyor, ama biz kendimize ait hatalar\u0131 konu\u015fmay\u0131 sevmeyiz. Birka\u00e7 soru sorsan\u0131z, \u015f\u00fcphelerinizi dile getirseniz hemen \u015firketin ticari itibar\u0131na ve kazanc\u0131na darbe vuruldu\u011fu iddias\u0131yla mahkeme yolu g\u00f6sterilir, herkesi sustururlar. Kaza inceleme raporlar\u0131n\u0131n beklenmesi \u00e7a\u011fr\u0131s\u0131, \u201c4-5 y\u0131l bekleyin, konu\u015fmay\u0131n, olay so\u011fusun, unutulsun\u201d demektir. Halbuki bat\u0131 \u00fclkelerinde her\u015fey konu\u015fuluyor, hakl\u0131 veya haks\u0131z iddialar havada u\u00e7u\u015fuyor; bu bir kaos de\u011fil, konu\u015fma \u00f6zg\u00fcrl\u00fc\u011f\u00fcd\u00fcr. Yanl\u0131\u015f iddialar varsa \u015firketin bunu do\u011fru bilgilendirmelerle d\u00fczeltebilir. Bu tart\u0131\u015fma ortam\u0131nda olay \u00fczerinde beyin f\u0131rt\u0131nalar\u0131 yap\u0131lm\u0131\u015f olur, benzeri kazalar olmas\u0131n diye herkese ders \u00e7\u0131kart\u0131r, \u00f6nlemler artt\u0131r\u0131l\u0131r\u2026 Organizasyonel kazalar\u0131m\u0131zla ilgili konu\u015fma olgunlu\u011funa vard\u0131\u011f\u0131m\u0131zda, Isparta kazas\u0131 ile ba\u015flayabiliriz.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Kaynaklar:<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>1. Sosa R. Human Factors in Aviation. IATA Training &amp; Development Institute. 2013. Sec.7 (45).<\/p>\n<p>2. Lawrenson AJ, Braithwaite GR. Regulation or criminalization: What determines legal standards of safety culture in commercial aviation? Safety Science. Vol 102, Feb 2018, pp. 251-62.<\/p>\n<p>3. Pidgeon N, O\u2019leary M. Organizational safety culture: implications for Aviation practice. In: Johnston N, McDonald N, Fuller R. (Eds.) Aviation Psychology in Practice. Ashgate Pub.Ltd. England 1999. pp. 27,29.<\/p>\n<p>4. G\u00f6k K. U\u00e7ak Kazalar\u0131. Alt\u0131n Bilek Yay. \u0130stanbul 2015. s. 147-53.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Yazar : Prof. Dr. Muzaffer \u00c7eting\u00fc\u00e7 Yay\u0131nlanma tarihi : 14 Ekim 2018 https:\/\/www.airkule.com\/yazar\/ORGANIZASYONEL-KAZALAR\/1291\/ \u2018Bu kazay\u0131 hep birlikte yapt\u0131k!\u2019 \u2018\u00c7\u00fcr\u00fck Elma Teorisi\u2019ne g\u00f6re, \u201cSistem \u00e7ok iyi, u\u00e7aklar da m\u00fckemmeldir; ama tembel, uyu\u015fuk, beceriksiz veya zay\u0131f insanlar vard\u0131r ve kazalar bunlar\u0131n y\u00fcz\u00fcnden olmaktad\u0131r. \u00c7\u00fcr\u00fck elmalar\u00a0(bad apples, rotten apples)\u00a0sistemden uzakla\u015ft\u0131r\u0131l\u0131rsa kazalar b\u00fcy\u00fck \u00f6l\u00e7\u00fcde \u00f6nlenmi\u015f olur&#8230; Bug\u00fcn bu teorinin ge\u00e7erlili\u011fine inanan kalmam\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. Kazalar\u0131n 2\/3\u2019\u00fcnde [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_eb_attr":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[6],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-3737","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bulten"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"jetpack-related-posts":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.hvtd.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3737","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.hvtd.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.hvtd.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.hvtd.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.hvtd.org\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=3737"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/www.hvtd.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3737\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":3738,"href":"https:\/\/www.hvtd.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3737\/revisions\/3738"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.hvtd.org\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=3737"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.hvtd.org\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=3737"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.hvtd.org\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=3737"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}