{"id":807,"date":"2012-08-05T21:45:41","date_gmt":"2012-08-05T18:45:41","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.hvtd.org\/?p=807"},"modified":"2023-12-21T15:05:21","modified_gmt":"2023-12-21T12:05:21","slug":"1999-thy-trakya-ucagi-kazasi","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.hvtd.org\/?p=807","title":{"rendered":"1999 THY – Trakya U\u00e7a\u011f\u0131 Kazas\u0131"},"content":{"rendered":"

\"\"<\/a>24 Aral\u0131k 2003 tarihli H\u00fcrriyet ve Sabah Gazetelerinde man\u015fetten verilen haberde, 7 Nisan 1999 saat 00.33’de vuku bulan u\u00e7ak kazas\u0131n\u0131n raporu a\u00e7\u0131klanmakta ve “Kabin G\u00f6revlileri Dikkat Da\u011f\u0131tt\u0131<\/strong>” ba\u015fl\u0131\u011f\u0131 kullan\u0131lmakta idi.<\/p>\n

OLAY:<\/strong> THY’nin Boeing 737-400 tipi Trakya u\u00e7a\u011f\u0131, Adana Havaalan\u0131ndan kalk\u0131\u015f\u0131ndan 11 dakika sonra bir tarlaya \u00e7ak\u0131ld\u0131. U\u00e7ak Suudi Arabistan-Cidde’ye hac\u0131lar\u0131 almak \u00fczere 2 pilot (Kaptan K\u0131v\u0131lc\u0131m Tuncer, \u0130kinci pilot Sami Bezcio\u011flu) ve 4 m\u00fcrettebat ile yolcusuz olarak havalanm\u0131\u015ft\u0131. Gazetelerde saniye saniye verilmi\u015f olan ses kay\u0131tlar\u0131, hosteslerin yalvarmalar\u0131n\u0131, paniklerini ve kaptan\u0131n ikinci pilota, “aman a\u011fabey, gittik, gidiyoruz, bas..” gibi konu\u015fmalar\u0131n\u0131 yans\u0131tmaktad\u0131r. SHGM U\u00e7u\u015f Standartlar\u0131 Daire B\u015fk. Haydar Yal\u00e7\u0131n ba\u015fkanl\u0131\u011f\u0131ndaki kurulun haz\u0131rlad\u0131\u011f\u0131 raporda, “kokpitte bulunan hosteslerin pilotlar\u0131n dikkatini da\u011f\u0131tmas\u0131 ile buzlanma \u00f6nleyici pitostatik s\u0131cakl\u0131k sisteminin devreye sokulmam\u0131\u015f olmas\u0131n\u0131n kazaya neden oldu\u011fu,<\/em>” bildirilmektedir.<\/p>\n

YORUM:<\/strong> Olaya havac\u0131l\u0131k t\u0131bb\u0131 bak\u0131\u015f a\u00e7\u0131s\u0131yla yakla\u015f\u0131ld\u0131\u011f\u0131nda, a\u015fa\u011f\u0131daki unsurlar\u0131n kazay\u0131 haz\u0131rlad\u0131\u011f\u0131 anla\u015f\u0131lmaktad\u0131r:<\/p>\n

1. U\u00e7u\u015f Disiplinsizli\u011fi:<\/strong> Kalk\u0131\u015f \u00f6ncesi yap\u0131lmas\u0131 gereken haz\u0131rl\u0131klarda \u00e7eklist’e uyulmam\u0131\u015f, bir gece u\u00e7u\u015funda pilota h\u0131z\u0131n\u0131 bildirecek olan pitostatik s\u0131cakl\u0131k sisteminin devreye sokulmas\u0131 unutulmu\u015f, kaptan taraf\u0131ndan da bu hata fark edilmemi\u015ftir (Al\u0131\u015fkanl\u0131k tuza\u011f\u0131). Pilotlar d\u0131\u015f\u0131ndaki ki\u015filerin (hostesler) kalk\u0131\u015f ve ini\u015f safhalar\u0131nda kokpitte bulundurulmas\u0131 ayr\u0131 bir disiplinsizliktir. Kritik durumlarda u\u00e7a\u011fa kumanda etmeyen ki\u015filerin panik yaratmalar\u0131 ve pilotlar\u0131n dikkatlerini da\u011f\u0131tmalar\u0131 olas\u0131l\u0131\u011f\u0131 bu kazada kan\u0131tlanm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r.<\/p>\n

2. Liderlik:<\/strong> Kaptan pilot, u\u00e7a\u011fa kumanda etmekte olan ikinci pilottan askeri ge\u00e7mi\u015fi itibariyle daha k\u0131demsizdir ve kazan\u0131n olu\u015fum s\u00fcrecindeki diyaloglar\u0131nda, kaptan\u0131n bu hiyerar\u015fik stat\u00fc karma\u015fas\u0131n\u0131 a\u015famad\u0131\u011f\u0131, \u00e7ekingen davrand\u0131\u011f\u0131 ve o anki kritik pozisyonun gerektirdi\u011fi otoriteyi sa\u011flayamad\u0131\u011f\u0131 g\u00f6r\u00fclmektedir. Ya\u015f\u0131 ve ge\u00e7mi\u015fte kalan askeri k\u0131demi ne olursa olsun, kaptan pilot bu u\u00e7aktaki en tecr\u00fcbeli, en yetkili ve en sorumlu ki\u015fi olup b\u00f6yle bir durum daha ba\u015flang\u0131\u00e7ta m\u00fcdahale etmeyi gerektirirdi. Olay\u0131n kazas\u0131z atlat\u0131lmas\u0131 halinde, titiz davran\u0131\u015f\u0131n\u0131n sayg\u0131s\u0131zl\u0131k, korkakl\u0131k gibi de\u011ferlendirilip ele\u015ftirilece\u011fi endi\u015fesi kaptan\u0131 m\u00fcdahaleden al\u0131koymu\u015f olabilir; ama zaten iyi bir lider bunlar\u0131 a\u015fabilen, u\u00e7u\u015f g\u00fcvenli\u011fi ad\u0131na yapt\u0131klar\u0131n\u0131n ard\u0131nda cesaretle durabilen ki\u015fidir.<\/p>\n

3. Ustal\u0131k (mastery):<\/strong> \u0130kinci pilotun askeri u\u00e7uculuktan ayr\u0131ld\u0131ktan sonra 8-10 y\u0131l u\u00e7mamas\u0131n\u0131n, baz\u0131 u\u00e7u\u015f becerilerini azaltm\u0131\u015f olmas\u0131 muhtemeldir. Belki de usta ve tecr\u00fcbeli bir pilot, u\u00e7ak dal\u0131\u015fta iken birden \u00e7ekerse perd\u00f6vites olabilece\u011fini, bunun yerine belki de dal\u0131\u015fta h\u0131z artt\u0131r\u0131p daha sonra \u00e7ekerek u\u00e7a\u011f\u0131 da kendilerini de kurtarabilece\u011fini d\u00fc\u015f\u00fcnebilirdi.(Buna benzer ba\u015fka spek\u00fclasyonlar da ileri s\u00fcr\u00fclebilir.) Buna kar\u015f\u0131l\u0131k kokpitte pani\u011fe kap\u0131lmadan son ana kadar kendince \u00e7aba g\u00f6steren en so\u011fukkanl\u0131 ki\u015finin ikinci pilot oldu\u011fu da, bir pozitif tutum olarak ses kay\u0131tlar\u0131ndan anla\u015f\u0131lmaktad\u0131r; ancak bu olumlu davran\u0131\u015f di\u011fer hatalar\u0131 bast\u0131rmaya yetmemi\u015ftir.<\/p>\n

4. Karar Verme:<\/strong> E\u011fitim, tecr\u00fcbe, dikkat, kurallara uyma ve liderlik unsurlar\u0131, seri ve do\u011fru karar vermeyi kolayla\u015ft\u0131r\u0131r. Bu kazada ikinci pilot da, kaptan pilot da maalesef karar verme hatalar\u0131 yapm\u0131\u015flard\u0131r.<\/p>\n

SONU\u00c7:<\/strong> Bu bir CRM ve LSA kazas\u0131 gibi g\u00f6r\u00fcnmektedir. CRM, U\u00e7u\u015f Ekibi (Kokpit) Kaynaklar\u0131 Y\u00f6netimi anlam\u0131na gelen bir kavram olup, “Crew (Cockpit) Resources Management” s\u00f6zc\u00fcklerinden yap\u0131lm\u0131\u015f bir k\u0131saltmad\u0131r. Yani kokpit i\u00e7indeki m\u00fcrettebat gerek birbirleriyle olan ili\u015fkilerinde, gerekse u\u00e7u\u015fun idaresinde disiplin ve koordinasyonu yitirmi\u015fler, yakla\u015fan kazan\u0131n pani\u011fini ya\u015fayan hosteslerin tela\u015f\u0131 pilotlar\u0131n u\u00e7u\u015fa konsantrasyonunu bir \u00f6l\u00e7\u00fcde bozup do\u011fru karar vermelerini engellemi\u015f; kaptan otoritesini, ikinci pilot da ustal\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 kullanamam\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. LSA ise, Durum Muhakemesi Kayb\u0131 anlam\u0131na gelen “Loss of Situational Awareness” s\u00f6zc\u00fcklerinin ilk harflerinden t\u00fcretilmi\u015f bir kavramd\u0131r. Bu olayda pilot, d\u0131\u015f g\u00f6r\u00fc\u015f referans\u0131n\u0131n bulunmad\u0131\u011f\u0131 bir ortamda alet u\u00e7u\u015fu yaparken, pitostatik sistem devre d\u0131\u015f\u0131 oldu\u011fundan, altimetre, varyometre ve s\u00fcrat saatinden veri alamam\u0131\u015f, yani h\u0131z\u0131n\u0131 ve irtifay\u0131 bilmeden (veya yanl\u0131\u015f bilgilerle) ve durum cayrosunu do\u011fru de\u011ferlendiremeden u\u00e7maya \u00e7al\u0131\u015fm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. Sonu\u00e7ta vertigo olmadan oryantasyonunu kaybetmi\u015f olan pilot, anormal durumdaki u\u00e7a\u011fa yanl\u0131\u015f kumanda vermi\u015ftir. Bu kazan\u0131n faturas\u0131 6 can, bir u\u00e7ak ve ulusal bir havayolu \u015firketimize duyulan g\u00fcvenin bir par\u00e7a azalmas\u0131d\u0131r.<\/p>\n

Havac\u0131l\u0131k T\u0131bb\u0131 Derne\u011fi olarak, Trakya u\u00e7a\u011f\u0131 kazas\u0131n\u0131n olu\u015f nedenlerinin \u00f6rtbas edilmemesini, Ula\u015ft\u0131rma Bakanl\u0131\u011f\u0131 taraf\u0131ndan hatalar\u0131n a\u00e7\u0131k\u00e7a ve resmen ortaya konulmu\u015f bulunmas\u0131n\u0131 takdirle kar\u015f\u0131l\u0131yoruz. Ancak bu raporun haz\u0131rlanmas\u0131n\u0131n herhangi bir a\u015famas\u0131nda, kazadaki insan fakt\u00f6r\u00fcn\u00fc de\u011ferlendirmek amac\u0131yla bir u\u00e7u\u015f doktorunun fikrinin al\u0131nd\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 sanm\u0131yoruz. Bu e\u011fitimi alm\u0131\u015f hekimler art\u0131k Bakanl\u0131kta da, THY b\u00fcnyesinde de kadrolu personel olarak g\u00f6revde bulunmakta iken, kaza sonras\u0131nda yard\u0131mlar\u0131n\u0131 talep etmemenin mazereti olamaz. Ayr\u0131ca bir kaza raporunda mutlaka toksikopatolojik inceleme sonucu da yer almal\u0131d\u0131r; pilotlar\u0131n g\u0131da zehirlenmesi, alkol veya ila\u00e7 etkisi alt\u0131nda olup olmad\u0131klar\u0131n\u0131n tayini gerekir. FAA’da rutin olan bu inceleme i\u00e7in mutlaka JAA direktifi mi gerekir, yoksa sivil havac\u0131l\u0131k otoritelerimizin inisiyatif kullanmalar\u0131n\u0131n \u00f6n\u00fcnde bir engel mi vard\u0131r? Kaybedilen can, mal ve itibar hepimizindir.<\/p>\n

Do\u00e7. Dr. Muzaffer \u00c7eting\u00fc\u00e7 <\/strong><\/p>\n

\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

24 Aral\u0131k 2003 tarihli H\u00fcrriyet ve Sabah Gazetelerinde man\u015fetten verilen haberde, 7 Nisan 1999 saat 00.33’de vuku bulan u\u00e7ak kazas\u0131n\u0131n raporu a\u00e7\u0131klanmakta ve “Kabin G\u00f6revlileri Dikkat Da\u011f\u0131tt\u0131” ba\u015fl\u0131\u011f\u0131 kullan\u0131lmakta idi. OLAY: THY’nin Boeing 737-400 tipi Trakya u\u00e7a\u011f\u0131, Adana Havaalan\u0131ndan kalk\u0131\u015f\u0131ndan 11 dakika sonra bir tarlaya \u00e7ak\u0131ld\u0131. U\u00e7ak Suudi Arabistan-Cidde’ye hac\u0131lar\u0131 almak \u00fczere 2 pilot (Kaptan K\u0131v\u0131lc\u0131m Tuncer, \u0130kinci pilot Sami […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":1307,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_eb_attr":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[9],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-807","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-turkucakkazalari"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"https:\/\/www.hvtd.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2012\/08\/1999Trakyaucakkazasi1-300x2171.jpg","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"jetpack-related-posts":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.hvtd.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/807","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.hvtd.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.hvtd.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.hvtd.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.hvtd.org\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=807"}],"version-history":[{"count":2,"href":"https:\/\/www.hvtd.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/807\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":3594,"href":"https:\/\/www.hvtd.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/807\/revisions\/3594"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.hvtd.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/media\/1307"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.hvtd.org\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=807"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.hvtd.org\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=807"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.hvtd.org\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=807"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}